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A STUDY OF CANON LAW:
DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL
STATE IN CASES OF SEXUAL
MISCONDUCT
MSGR. JOHN A. ALESANDRO"
I. BACKGROUND
This article specifically addresses the case of a priest who is
guilty of sexually abusing a minor and whom the diocesan bishop
considers such a danger to children that he should not in any
way function as a priest. Such a priest may seek a dispensation
from the Holy See to be returned to the lay state.' There are
occasions, however, where, for various reasons, the priest refuses
to make a voluntary petition to the Holy See. The bishops of the
The author is the vicar for administration of the Roman Catholic Diocese of
Rockville Centre, New York. He holds a licentiate in theology and a doctorate in
canon law from the Gregorian University, Rome, and a doctorate in civil law from
St. John's University School of Law, Jamaica, New York. He has served as a
consultant to the Canonical Affairs Committee of the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops since 1975, was a member of the Papal joint commission on the
judicial process of dismissal, and drafted the N.C.C.B. document Canonical Delicts
Involving Sexual Misconduct and Dismissal from the Clerical State.
1 See 1983 CODE c.290. "Sacred ordination once validly received never becomes
invalid. A cleric, however, loses the clerical state ... by a rescript of the Apostolic
See; this rescript, however, is granted by the Apostolic See to deacons for only grave
reasons and to priests for only the gravest of reasons." Id. See also THE CODE OF
CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY (James A. Coriden et al. eds., 1985); Rev.
Bertram F. Griffin, The Reassignment or Nonassignment of a Cleric Who Has Been
Professionally Evaluated and Treated for Sexual Misconduct with Minors:
Canonical Considerations, 35 CATH. LAW. 295, 301-03 (1992) [originally published in
51 JuRIsT 326 (1991)].
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United States have been struggling to resolve such a matter in a
canonically acceptable manner. Most bishops have been loath to
invoke the process in the Code of Canon Law' for the punitive
dismissal of the priest from the clerical state. In some cases,
however, use of the process has become a necessity.'
A. Administrative Approaches
1. Administrative Penal Procedure
For several years, the perception of some bishops seemed to
indicate that what was needed in lieu of the judicial penal
process was an administrative process of dismissal from the
clerical state.4 Conversations were held at various levels within
2 See Introduction to THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra
note 1, at 1-22. The Code of Canon Law has developed from the Church's need for a
systematic means to administer ecclesiastical and juridic law. Id. at 1, 11. In 325
A.D. the Council of Nicaea, the first of the Church's ecumenical councils, combined
pastoral practices and fundamental ecclesial norms into rules called "canons." Id. at
1-2. Throughout the centuries, the Church sought to meet the changing needs of the
parishes and to enforce the traditional church disciplines. The Church
accommodated these needs by updating and adding to "canon law." Id. at 2. In 1917
all the laws of the Latin Catholic Church were combined and organized in an official
volume of legislation, known as the 1917 Code of Canon Law. John A. Alesandro,
Introduction to THE CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY, at 4.
The 1917 Code was revised in 1983 to conform to the changing focus of the
Catholic Church as identified by the Second Vatican Council. The purpose of the
revised Code includes defining and protecting the rights and obligations of the
church members in their relationships with each other and the church. JAMES A.
CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAw, 35-36 (1991). The 1983 Code of Canon
Law is divided into seven sections: General Norms, The People of God, The Teaching
Function, The Sanctifying Function, Temporal Goods of the Church, Sanctions in
the Church, and Procedures. Id. at 38-39. The Code consists of 1,752 canons that
represent the law for the Latin Church. Id. at 39-40. While the Code does not
contain all of the norms of the Catholic Church, all additional church norms must
accord with the ones in the Code. Id. at 40-41.
3 The same process is used to dismiss a temporary or permanent deacon from the
clerical state, but this article focuses on priests. In fact, this article concentrates
specifically on diocesan priests since priests who are members of religious institutes
are already subject to dismissal from their religious institute (1983 CODE cc.695-
703, 746). Although the matter is controverted, it seems that dismissal from a
religious institute effectively leaves a priest, who was formerly a religious within
the clerical state, without any institutional connection and therefore prohibited
from functioning as a priest unless incorporated, at least temporarily, into some
other religious institute (1983 CODE cc.695, 701). See James H. Provost, Some
Canonical Considerations Relative to Clerical Sexual Misconduct, 52 JURIST 615,
625-626 (1992).See Karen Ann Ballotta, Losing Its Soul: How the Cipolla Case Limits the
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the National Conference of Catholic Bishops ("NCCB") and
between representatives of the NCCB and the Apostolic See.5
The goal was to streamline the cumbersome judicial process
required by the Code whenever a priest faced the severe and
permanent penalty of dismissal for a canonical delict by placing
it in the hands of the diocesan bishop.6 They viewed the
predicament as a pastorally devastating situation which
required immediate and decisive action: "removal of the priest
from the priesthood" - or, more properly, "removal of the priest
from the clerical state."'
While various proposals were submitted, it was difficult to
come to an accord on an appropriate procedure which would
protect all the rights of those involved: the priest, the Church,
Catholic Church's Ability to Discipline Sexually Abusive Priests, 43 EMORY L.J.
1431, 1439 (1994) (stating that bishops are dissatisfied with current canonical
system's ability to provide viable options for bishops to discipline sexually abusive
priests). Without guidance from the Vatican, bishops have attempted to establish
procedures to use when a priest is accused of sexual assault. Bishops have tried to
institute procedures that will meet the needs of the Church, the accused cleric, and
the victim. Id. at 1438-40. The National Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB)
recommends that dioceses, upon finding that allegations are supported by sufficient
evidence, relieve the cleric of his ministerial duties and refer him for medical
evaluation and therapy. Id. at 1438-39 n.32. Until the canonical penal process is
expedited or modified, bishops will seek an administrative process to curtail an
accused cleric's ministry. Id. at 1444.
' After various meetings concerning sex abuse, the NCCB asked the Vatican to
approve changes in church law to expedite the dismissal of guilty clerics. See Larry
B. Stammer, Bishops Seek Easier Dismissal of Priests, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at
A12 (arguing that Church law should be changed since current appeal process drags
out removal of clerics for years); see also Judith Lynn Howard, Bishops Act Against
Clergy Sex Abuse; Prelates Want Easier Means to Remove Offenders, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 20, 1993, at 37A (discussing bishops petitioning Holy See to
change canon law to help shorten laicization of clerics).
6 See John P. Beal, Doing What One Can: Canon Law and Clerical Sexual
Misconduct, 52 JURIST 642, 647 (1992). The options the canon law offers for dealing
with clerics who are guilty of sexual misconduct are not "palatable; none is easy; and
none solves all the problems that are apt to arise as a result of cases of this kind."
Id. at 672.
7 The phrase "removal from the priesthood" can be misleading. A priest, once
ordained, remains validly ordained. Nothing can undo his ordination nor in this
sense remove him from the "priesthood" as such (1983 CODE c.290). Thus, any
priest, even if excommunicated would be permitted to absolve a penitent who is in
danger of death (1983 CODE c.976). But the rights and duties of priests, their
juridical incorporation into the Church, and their commission to function as priests
in the name of the Church are all legal concepts which are gathered together under
the rubric of 'clerical state." The more precise term therefore is to remove or
dismiss someone from the 'clerical state," not from the "priesthood."
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the bishop and the community. Besides the bishops' perception
of a pastoral need for a definitive separation of the priest from
the clerical state, diocesan attorneys advised bishops of the
potential liability for future wrongful acts of such a priest if the
diocese chose to maintain a supervisory relationship with that
priest.' To allow the priest to continue in any sort of official
assignment, or to permit him to function in his ministry, even
simply to house him for therapy and to support him financially,
could be considered indicia of a supervisory relationship.9
Because a diocesan bishop has the responsibility to provide both
support and social assistance for a suspended priest, attorneys
for the Church prefer to see a more definitive separation of the
priest from the diocese, i.e., his complete removal from the
clerical state and his return to the lay state.' °
Thus, the goal of streamlining for many bishops was to
formulate an administrative process aimed not merely at
' Litigation against hierarchical churches for the actions of its clerics is common.
See generally Mark E. Chopko, Ascending Liability of Religious Entities for the
Actions of Others, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 289, 294-95 (1993) (indicating "that civil
responsibility may follow ecclesial discipline as it moves through the various layers
of the organization until it resides in that entity which has both the juridic power
and civil duty to answer for the actions of individuals or organizations at a lower
level."); David Briggs, Sex Abuse Cases Have Church Reeling, Crisis: Catholic
Dioceses Across U.S. Prepare to Pay Tens, If Not Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in
Legal Fees and Reparations, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at B4 (estimating that costs
of clerical sex abuse scandals in United States range upwards of half billion dollars).
9 See Griffin, supra note 1, at 296-98 (discussing distinctions among right to
ministry, remuneration for ministry, and decent support); see also Provost, supra
note 3, at 631-33 (discussing Church's support of clergy); Chopko, supra note 8, at
310-27 (discussing respondeat superior and various negligence bases for liability);
Nicholas Cafardi, Stones Instead of Bread: Sexually Abusive Priests in Ministry, 27
STUDIA CANONICA 145, 160-163 (1993) (discussing Church's relationship to priests);
John Does 1-9 v. CompCare, Inc., 763 P.2d 1237, 1244 (Wash. App. 1988) (holding
that Washington Supreme Court has personal jurisdiction over diocese). There is
disagreement in the civil courts concerning the degree of vicarious liability of a
bishop for actions of a priest. Compare Stevens v. Bishop of Fresno, 123 Cal.Rptr.
171 (Ct. App. 1975) (concluding that priest was agent of corporation solely and acted
within scope of agency at time of collision) with Ambrosio v. Price, 495 F. Supp. 381,
385 (D. Neb. 1979) (holding that plaintiff could not recover from priest's employer).10 1983 CODE c.384. See Rev. John P. Beal, Administrative Leave: Canon 1722
Revisited, 27 STUDIA CANONICA 293, 294-96 (1993). In response to complaints of
clerical sexual misconduct, the bishops have tried withdrawing the cleric from his
residence and barring him from public ministry. This has been referred to as
"administrative leave." Id. at 294-95. However, this administrative process does not
necessarily comport with the Code which provides for leave from ministerial duties
only after an official penal investigation has been initiated. Id. at 295-96.
260
DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE
improving procedural efficiencies, but providing a decision-
making standard and apparatus by which the diocesan bishop
would dismiss the priest based on pastoral necessity. The vision
by canon lawyers, however, of an administrative process, was the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the clerical state by
the diocesan bishop in a non-judicial manner, but with due
process protections for the priest. In other words, by using the
word "administrative," many bishops were looking for a "non-
penal" procedure.
2. Administrative Non-Penal Removal
It soon became apparent that while a judicial procedure may
be cumbersome and, more importantly, may remove the ultimate
decision from the diocesan bishop to a collegiate tribunal of three
qualified priest-judges, simply converting the judicial penal
process into an administrative penal process would not provide
diocesan bishops with what they were seeking. There were more
fundamental canonical realities which made the penal process a
clumsy and often inapplicable way of separating the priest from
the clerical state.
While continuing to develop a suitable process to meet the
pastoral situation in the United States, the NCCB recognized
that the judicial procedure, as well as the very nature of
dismissal from the clerical state as a canonically imposed
penalty, was problematic. Furthermore, the five-year statute of
limitations ruled out dismissal in many cases which came to
light at a later time-a frequent occurrence." The fact that the
canonical delict for abusing a minor defined the minor as under
sixteen years of age seemed minimalist in states where state
criminal codes used an older age.1" Finally, and most
1 1983 CODE c.1362 §1. "A criminal action is extinguished by prescription after
three years, except for ... an action arising from any of the offenses mentioned in
cann. 1394, 1395, 1397, 1398, which is extinguished after five years ...." Id. Canon
1395 creates penalties for clerics who sexually abuse a minor. See Stammer, supra
note 5, at A12 (reporting NCCB petitioned Vatican to extend five-year statute of
limitations for filing charges against priest offenders: suggesting older charges may
be brought as long as victim brings them before twenty-third birthday; proposing
that diocesan bishop could take action within two years of hearing credible
accusation of sexual abuse).
12 See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw §130.05 (McKinney 1987); N.Y. PENAL LAW §260.10
(McKinney 1996); see also Howard, supra note 5, at 37A (reporting proposals to
change statute of limitations would bring canon law more in line with age for
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importantly, there seemed to be a rather prevalent opinion that
the psychopathology suffered by such priests almost
automatically exempted them from the penalty insofar as the
imposition of dismissal requires "full" imputability, not merely
"grave" imputability.3
Accordingly, the NCCB proposed not "dismissal," but
administrative "removal," from the clerical state. The pastoral
facts and circumstances, past, present and future (e.g., likelihood
of recidivism), would determine whether grounds for removal
existed. Thus, in 1992, the NCCB's Canonical Affairs Committee
developed for discussion purposes a process modelled on the
administrative removal from the pastorate. 4
Although the proposed process could not be initiated unless
there was proof that the priest had committed a canonically-
proscribed offense, it was not a penal process. There was no
statute of limitations, and the reasons for or against removal
balanced both the gravity of the harm and need for correction,
reparation and restoration of justice with practical judgments
about the feasibility of the priest's continued ministry in any
form as well as his potential danger to others. The central basis
for removing the cleric is analogous to the reason for
administrative removal of a pastor. Removal would result if the
cleric's ministry had become permanently harmful (noxium) to
the Church or completely ineffective (inefficax) in any reasonable
ecclesial situation because of his past acts and if, all things
considered, his continued ministry in any form whatsoever would
represent a grave danger to the Church. 5
criminal liability in many state jurisdictions).
" 1983 CODE c.1324 §1, 10° . Canon 1324 states, "The perpetrator of a violation is
not exempted from penalty, but the penalty prescribed in the law or precept must be
diminished, or in penance substituted in its place, if the offense was committed
by...one who acted without full imputability, provided it remained grave." Id.
14 1983 CODE cc.1740-47. These canons discuss the procedure for the removal or
transfer of pastors. The diocesan bishop has the power to remove a pastor if his
ministry has become harmful or ineffective. Id. at c.1740. A pastor can be removed
for acting in a way that harms the ecclesiastical communion, for permanent illness,
for loss of good name, for violating parochial duties, and for poor administration of
temporal goods. Id. at c.1741. The Bishop should discuss the reasons for removing a
pastor with two other pastors and thereafter try to persuade the pastor to resign.
Id. at c.1742. If the pastor will not resign, the Bishop should issue a decree of
removal and ensure that the pastor's next assignment is a suitable one. Id. at
cc.1744, 1746.
'5 See Canonical Affairs Committee, Draft of Special Norms for Administrative
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The determination of the gravity and permanence of such a
situation would take into consideration factors such as the
following:
a) whether the cleric's acts resulted from a persistent mental or
physical disease or defect, rendering him unsuitable to carry out
the duties of a cleric, and, even with appropriate treatment, it is
reasonably foreseen that the cleric will not be able to carry out
his ministry without grave danger of harm to the Church.
b) whether the cleric has lost his good reputation among
upright and good members of the Christian faithful and among
the public at large, or his behavior has given rise to an aversion
which cannot be dispelled.
c) whether the cleric's acts have seriously damaged the good
reputation of other clerics, or of the clerical state in general or
have caused serious scandal which, it is reasonably foreseen,
will persist or even increase if the cleric continues to exercise
his ministry.
d) whether the behavior of the cleric has already exposed
ecclesiastical juridic persons and ecclesiastical authority to
severe financial liability or, without his permanent
disassociation from the Church, the ecclesiastical patrimony of
the entities which would otherwise be responsible for him will
be placed in serious jeopardy."
This was not merely a procedurally administrative
approach, but substantially an administrative approach. The
procedural aspect of the proposed process was quasi-judicial in
nature. Though essentially administrative, the procedure
provided notice, opportunity to be heard, use of official priest-
advisors, discovery, right to canonical counsel, right of recourse,
and other elements of due process. 7 More significantly, however,
the act itself had substantively become an administrative act of
Removal of a Cleric from the Clerical State, May 1, 1992, Norm 1 [unpublished].
When, for the reasons stated in Norm 2, the ministry of a diocesan cleric
has become permanently harmful to the Church or completely ineffective
and his continued ministry represents a grave danger to the Church, the
cleric may be administratively removed from the clerical state by the
diocesan bishop of his diocese of incardination in accordance with the
procedure found in Norms 2-14.
Id.16 1992 Draft, Norm 3.
17 See 1992 Draft, Norms 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 14 for examples of norms dealing with due
process drafted for discussion purposes.
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the bishop, rather than a penalty for violating a canonical delict.
The proposed process was not well received.18 Some canon
lawyers in the United States criticized the process on the basis
that, despite the due process protections, the process could be too
easily abused. This radically new approach also met with
significant resistance within the Roman Curia.
B. Judicial Approach
A series of meetings by representatives of the NCCB and
Curial officials failed to produce agreement on an administrative
approach. In May 1993, after consulting with representatives of
the United States hierarchy, the Holy Father instructed that a
small commission, consisting of a bishop and two canonists from
the Apostolic See and similar personnel from the NCCB, be
appointed to study the judicial process. 9
1. Papal Joint Commission
This ad hoc joint commission, established by the Holy See,2°
met in Rome on June 14-15, 1993. Its purpose was "to study how
to apply the universal canonical norms governing judicial process
to the particular situation of the United States regarding the
well-known problem."" The small working group analyzed the
various provisions in canon law which were applicable to the
situation, noting the possibility of derogations from the law
which the NCCB might wish to propose to the Holy See, and
interpreted how canon law should be applied to cases of clerics
who have sexually abused a minor.22
18 See generally, Beal, supra note 10, at 315 (resorting to administrative process
threatens balance between rights of community and rights of accused individual).
1" The activities of this Commission were widely publicized. See, e.g., Gustav
Niebuhr, Pope Acts on Sex Abuse-Panel to Speed Ouster of Offending Priests,
WASH. POST, June 22, 1993, at Al.
20 The members of the ad hoc joint commission were: Bishop Julian Herranz
Casado, Secretary of the Pontifical Council for the Interpretation of Legislative
Texts; Archbishop Adam J. Maida, Archbishop of Detroit; Msgr. John A. Alesandro,
Chancellor of the Diocese of Rockville Centre; Msgr. Raymond L. Burke, Defender of
the Bond of the Apostolic Signatura, Rome; Rev. Velasio de Paolis, Professor at the
Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome; Rev. John V. Dolciamore, Professor at
Mundelein Seminary, Chicago.
21 Appointment letter of Cardinal Sodano, May 31, 1993.
22 Joint Commission, Proposals and Suggestions of Joint Commission "Ad Hoc,"
June 15, 1993.
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The Canonical Affairs Committee of the NCCB was charged
with the task of studying the proposals and moving things along.
The committee undertook to develop a document capable of
providing practical guidelines on the use of the judicial process
which addressed the principal questions tending to arise in such
cases. From the joint commission's report, the committee drew
potential derogations of the law in this area which might
facilitate the use of the judicial process.
2. Derogations of the Law for Dioceses Within the NCCB
The proposed derogations were adopted by an overwhelming
vote of the conference of bishops in November 1993 and sent to
the Holy See for consideration and approval." During the next
few months, the proposals were examined and commented upon
by various Curial dicasteries. On April 12-13, 1994, the joint
commission then studied the derogations and comments in order
to prepare a final report and recommendation for consideration
by the Holy See.
a. Raising the Age in Canon 1395, §2 From Below Sixteen to
Below Eighteen
This proposal sought to change a substantive element of the
delict of sexual abuse of a "minor" by redefining the term to
mean any person under the age of eighteen. While state
criminal codes vary as to what the age below which the capacity
for consent to sexual acts is presumed to be lacking, it was felt
that the canonical element should not be linked to local civil
legislation and should not vary from state to state. Some
bishops felt that the limitation of such a delict to those under
sixteen years of age set the cut off at too early an age. They
concluded that a cleric should be liable for dismissal for
committing any sexual act with a young person not yet eighteen,
which is the general canonical age of majority. Since age is an
element of the delict itself, the proposed derogation by the Holy
See is prospective in nature, not retroactive. On April 25, 1994,
the Holy Father approved the proposed change in age, effective
2 See Associated Press, Bishops Aim to Ease Removal of Abusers, THE RECORD
(Bergen Record Corp.), Nov. 18, 1993, at A30 (reporting that National Conference of
Bishops, in 219-5 vote, overwhelmingly approved derogations).
24 1983 CODE c.97, §1.
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immediately for a probationary period of five years."
b. Period of Prescription (cc.1362, 1395)
In canon law, the state law concept of a period set by a
statute of limitations is called the period of prescription. 6 Once
the period expires, the criminal action to impose a penalty for
commission of the delict is extinguished. Its operation is similar
to a bar resulting from the statute of limitations although, unlike
state law, it is not merely an affirmative defense; the action
simply cannot be brought. Currently, the prescription for the
delict of sexual abuse of a minor is five years from the most
recent delictual act.27 This is two years longer than the standard
period of prescription.28
In November 1993, the bishops voted to request that two
additional periods of prescription supplement the five-year
period: 9
i) the period from the commission of the delict until the day the
victim who was sexually abused as a minor has completed his or
her twenty-third year of age;
3°
ii) two years after the diocesan bishop of the cleric's diocese of
incardination first "receives information, which has at least the
semblance of truth"31 that the cleric has sexually abused a
minor, if more than five years have passed since the most recent
offense and the victim is older than twenty-three.32
25 "With regard to can. 1395, §2: this norm is to be applied to delicts committed
with any minor as defined in can. 97, §1, and not only with a minor under sixteen
years of age." Secretariat of State, Rescript from Audience of His Holiness, N.
346.053, 4/25/94 [hereinafter 4 /25/94 Rescript].
21 See, e.g., 1983 CODE c.1362, §§ 1, 20 (stating periods of prescription of criminal
action); 1983 CODE c.1363, §§ 1, 2 (delineating period of prescription of penal
action).
27 1983 CODE c.1362, §§ 1, 20 (stating that action due to offense mentioned in
c. 1395, violation of clerical chastity, has prescription of five years).
28 1983 CODE c.1362, §1 ("A criminal action is extinguished by prescription in
three years .... ").
29 See Stammer, supra note 5, at 12.
30 id.
31 1983 CODE c.1717, §1.
2 Stammer, supra note 5, at 12. This last addition would afford the diocesan
bishop two years after the duty of canon 1717 to investigate when matters first
arise. During that discovery period, the action could be brought even if the first two
periods had already expired. Conversely, if the information received by the diocesan
bishop was not acted upon or the investigation was inconclusive, this period would
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Each of the three periods would be independent of the other
two. For the action to be time-barred, all three must have
expired prior to the citation of the accused. Prescription, like the
civil law statute of limitations, is fundamentally procedural. It
is not an element of the delict; it affects only the judicial remedy.
Accordingly, the bishops requested that the change be made
retroactive, applying to all processes commenced after its
approval, even though the acts giving rise to the delict occurred
before that date.33
These proposed derogations would change the period of
prescription dramatically, particularly the two-year discovery
window expressed above and the retroactive nature of the
changes. Concern was expressed about these two, more extreme
departures from canonical practice.' In discussing the
proposals, an alternative approach emerged: the possibility of
extending the period beyond five years (possibly to ten years),
but keeping it fixed in nature. It was also suggested that a
window linked to denunciation should not be free-floating, but in
the form of an "extension" of the statute of limitations at the end
of the stated period if it had not yet expired.
On the other hand, the proposal's idea of "tolling" the period
until the minor completes his or her eighteenth year of age met
with greater acceptance. It could easily happen that a minor
might be prevented from bringing such delicts to the attention of
the authorities by parents unwilling to raise such an issue, by
the dominance of the perpetrator of the delict, or simply by the
minor's immaturity. The strategy of tolling, familiar in state
law, was also viewed as a basis for some retroactivity, at least
with regards to the proposed derogation described above."
expire two years after the receipt of the information, even if the other two periods
had not yet expired. See also Michael Briggs, Tougher Rules For Abusive Priests,
CHICAGO SUN TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at 1.
" While a retroactive change would permit bishops to address newly-discovered
delicts, one must keep in mind that the bringing of a penal action would still require
a formal decision by the diocesan bishop, as well as the filing of an accusatory
libellus by the Promoter of Justice. Moreover, if the action is brought the collegiate
tribunal, in determining whether dismissal would be an appropriate penalty, would
be required to take into account the length of time which had elapsed since the
delict was committed.
See Richard Vara, Bishops to Urge Vatican to Ease Laws in Ousting Abusive
Priests, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 18, 1993, at 15.
"See Griffin, supra note 1, at 308-09; John P. Beal, Doing What One Can: Canon
Law and Clerical Sexual Misconduct, 52 JURIST 642, 678-79 (1992).
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In the end, the lengthening of the statute of limitations and
the procedural devices of tolling and extension were used to
develop an alternative to the NCCB proposal. This alternative,
approved by the Holy Father on April 25, 1994, has different
prospective and retroactive effects.
i) Prospectively. Where sexual delicts are committed against
a minor on or after April 25, 1994, the promoter of justice may
not bring an action for dismissal from the clerical state on the
basis of canon 1395, §2 if the following periods have expired:
(1)The minor in question has completed his or her twenty-
eighth year of age.
(2)At least one year has passed from the denunciation of
the delict, provided that the denunciation was made before the
minor completed his or her twenty-eighth year of age. 6
If both conditions have occurred prior to the citation of the
accused, the action is time-barred. Effectively speaking, this
statute of limitations represents a variable period dependent on
the age of the minor at the time of the delict. If the minor were
ten years old at the time of the most recent act, the cleric would
be subject to the penalty for eighteen years (plus an extension of
no more than one year if the denunciation did not occur until the
minor in question was twenty-seven years of age). On the other
hand, if the minor were seventeen years old at the time of the
most recent act, the statute of limitations would expire in eleven
years (plus any applicable extension if denunciation were during
the last year of the period).
This new statute of limitations is applicable to all delicts
committed from April 25, 1994 until April 24, 1999, unless the
Holy See modifies the five-year probationary period of the
derogation. 7
ii)Retroactively. The above-described change in the statute
of limitations is not retroactive. It applies only to offenses
committed on or after April 25, 1994. Nonetheless, the Holy
Father promulgated a transitory norm affecting some delicts
committed prior to April 25, 1994. Such delicts with a minor
(i.e., one under sixteen years of age) are deemed to be actionable
by criminal process until the minor in question completes his or
36 4 /25/94 Rescript.
37 Id.
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her twenty-third year of age.38
Practically speaking, the transitory norm retroactively
"tolls" the applicable five-year statute of limitations in effect at
the time of the commission of the delict (no matter how old the
minor was at the time) until the minor in question has reached
the age of majority, at which time the five-year period begins to
run. For example, if the minor were precisely ten years old at
the time of the most recent act, the transitory norm would
consider the delict punishable for thirteen years, whereas, if the
victim were fifteen years of age at the time of the delict, the
action would not be deemed to be extinguished for eight years.
c. Appeal By the Defendant Or the Promoter of Justice At the
Local Level
When a diocesan tribunal hands down a sentence in any
case, including a penal action, appeal can normally be taken
either to the competent metropolitan 9 or regional appellate
tribunal, ° or to the Roman Rota.4' In November, 1993, the
bishops voted to request the Holy See to grant such local
appellate tribunals exclusive competency to hear appeals of
second instance cases involving dismissal from the clerical state
for sexual abuse of a minor.4" However, if there was a reversal
by the second instance tribunal, or, if in the case of two
conforming sentences, where a third instance appeal was
permissible because of new and serious proofs and arguments, 3
a third instance appeal would go to the Rota."
This proposed derogation met considerable opposition.
There is a long tradition of maintaining every person's right to
38 Id.
'9 1983 CODE c.1438, §1.
'0 1983 CODE c.1445, §3, 20. If a single tribunal of first instance has been
established for several dioceses, the conference of bishops must establish a tribunal
of second instance with the approval of the Apostolic See unless these dioceses all
belong to the same Archdiocese. Id.
41 1983 CODE c.1443 ("The ordinary tribunal established by the Roman Pontiff to
receive appeals is the Roman Rota").
4 Robin Edwards, Bishops Weather Storm, Address Family Issues, NAT'L CATH.
REP., Dec. 3, 1993, at 3. This would alter the present situation in which the Roman
Rota hears appeals which have been adjudicated by the ordinary tribunals of the
first instance. See 1983 CODE c.1444, §1, 1.
4 See 1983 CODE c.1644, §1.
" See 1983 CODE c.1444, §1, 2.
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appeal to the Holy See in second instance. While such appeals,
directly to Rome, may often be lodged purely for dilatory
motives, there may be less radical ways of addressing such
situations. Dialogue with Roman authorities about a speedier
resolution of such appeals, or the possibility of establishing one
or more regional appellate tribunals in the United States to hear
appeals in penal cases, might be just as effective in avoiding
dilatory tactics as limiting the Roman Rota to third instance.
The Holy Father rejected the proposal of the NCCB in this area,
leaving in place the traditional right of appeal to either the
competent local appellate tribunal or the Roman Rota.
3. NCCB Instruction
Besides the development and proposal of changes with
respect to procedural law, the Canonical Affairs Committee
published a document to assist diocesan bishops and their
tribunal personnel in applying the judicial process for dismissal
from the clerical state. 5 The document seeks to clarify the steps
in the process and address questions which would tend to arise
in a case of sexual abuse of a minor, including the important
element of imputability. Some of the points treated in the NCCB
instruction will be considered in the remainder of this article,
particularly insofar as they may be of special interest to diocesan
attorneys.
II. CANON 1395
Because of the cleric's special rights, duties, and privileges,
in particular, his obligation to live a life of celibate chastity,
canon law singles him out and allows his sexual misconduct with
a minor to be punished canonically while a lay person who
commits the same acts is not subject to similar ecclesiastical
penalties. Canon 1395 states the elements of the delict and the
potential infliction of the penalty of dismissal from the clerical
state.
Canon 1395.
§1. Outside the case mentioned in can. 1394, a cleric who lives
in concubinage or a cleric who remains in another external sin
4NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CANONICAL DELICTS INVOLVING
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE 1-47 (1995).
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against the sixth commandment of the Decalogue which
produces scandal is to be punished with a suspension; and if
such a cleric persists in such an offense after having been
admonished, other penalties can be added gradually including
dismissal from the clerical state.
§2. If a cleric has otherwise committed an offense against the
sixth commandment of the Decalogue with force or threats or
publicly or with a minor below the age of sixteen, the cleric is to
be punished with just penalties, including dismissal from the
clerical state if the case warrants it.
The two paragraphs of canon 1395 apply to a number of
situations. The first paragraph addresses sexual misconduct of a
persistent kind: those living in concubinage or some other
ongoing scandalous external sin against the sixth
commandment, such as cohabiting with a homosexual partner or
similarly engaging in a connected series of scandalous
homosexual or heterosexual acts comparable to cohabitation.
These cases normally begin with the imposition of suspension.
The persistence of the cleric in the prohibited way of life
transforms the offense into one in which an expiatory penalty,
like dismissal, rather than a medicinal penalty, like suspension,
may be the only effective way of dealing with the situation.
The second paragraph applies to a cleric whose violation of
the sixth commandment has been aggravated by especially
heinous circumstances: a sexual offense against another
perpetrated by the use of force or threats, such as an act of rape
against a woman or a man, even if the victim is not a minor; a
sexual offense committed in some sort of public manner, such as
an act of exposure or lewd conduct in public, even if no minor is
involved (e.g., between consenting adults); a sexual offense with
a young man or young woman who is not yet sixteen years of age,
even if committed secretly and without any physical force or
threats."6
Notice that a sexual offense violative of §2 need not be a
complete act of intercourse, nor should the term be equated with
the definitions of sexual abuse or other sexual crimes in civil
law.47 The norm is whether the act in question is an external act
"As noted above, "below sixteen" has been raised to "below eighteen" for all acts
committed on or after April 25, 1994. See 4/25/94 Rescript, supra note 25.
41 See N.Y. PENAL LAW §130.00 (McKinney 1994) (defining sex offense terms).
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which qualifies as an objectively grave violation of the Sixth
Commandment." We are not speaking here about imputability
or mens rea. This is an element of the actus reus. If there is
doubt about whether a specific act fulfills this definition, the
writings of recognized moral theologians and the testimony of
recognized experts must be used to resolve the doubt.
The sexual offenses specified in §2, if continued after a
warning, may be punished by a censure, such as suspension.
The difference from §1, however, is that, even without
persistence, such acts are punishable by expiatory penalties,49
including dismissal from the clerical state if the circumstances
warrant it. Of course, the individual facts must be carefully
weighed to determine whether the delict in question rises to the
level that calls for a permanent expiatory penalty."
In this regard, one must bear in mind that sexual abuse of a
minor may not be a solitary offense; there may be multiple
delicts subject to punishment. The same act may implicate
various delicts, such as where the cleric has elicited the
cooperation of a minor through threats of violence or has
sexually abused the minor by the use of physical force. In other
cases, the act of sexual misconduct may be inter-connected with
other delicts, such as solicitation during confession to sin against
the Sixth Commandment,5' violation of the seal of confession," or
4 See Exodus 20:14 ("Thou shalt not commit adultery.").
49 See 1983 CODE c.1312, §1 (stating that penal sanctions in Church consist of
medicinal penalties and expiatory penalties). Expiatory penalties deprive a believer
of some spiritual or temporal good in order to repair the damage caused by the
offender. 1983 CODE c.1312, §2; THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 897-98.
'o A medicinal penalty seeks principally the reformation and reconciliation of the
wrongdoer. It must always involve some sort of canonical warning prior to
imposition. Upon sufficient repentance and reparation, the penalty is remitted. By
its nature, therefore, it is temporally indefinite. See THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A
TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 897-98.
An expiatory penalty like dismissal, on the other hand, seeks principally to
redress the situation caused by the wrongful act. Thus, the initiation of the process
of dismissal does not require the cleric's disregard or disobedience of prior
admonishments or other acts of correction. The critical issue is not whether the
cleric has been warned to cease and desist and has persisted in his offense (although
repeated violations after such warnings would clearly strengthen the case for
dismissal), but whether the heinousness of the delict is such as to warrant
dismissal. Id. at 897-98.51 1983 CODE c.1387.
52 See 1983 CODE c.1388, §1.
DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE
abuse of office.5"
III. INITIAL INVESTIGATION AND DETERMINATION
Before initiating the process of dismissal, the diocesan
bishop must be reasonably certain of two facts. First, it must be
determined that the cleric is guilty of the canonical delict in
question, even though the establishment of such a fact in a
judicial proceeding may be difficult and may not prove to be
successful. Second, assuming that proof of guilt will be
successful, the diocesan bishop must be reasonably certain that
the canonical imposition of a penalty, which may include
dismissal from the clerical state, is the appropriate method of
dealing with the overall pastoral situation. Thus, the
preliminary investigation and initiatory decree are extremely
important steps.54
A. Investigation (cc. 1717-1719)
The canons require very little substance to impose the duty
of investigation on the bishop. If the information "at least seems
to be true of an offense, he shall cautiously inquire personally or
through another suitable person about the facts and
circumstances and about imputability."" Any such preliminary
information is to be kept in the secret archives unless it is
See 1983 CODE c.1389, §1 (stating that one who abuses ecclesiastical power or
function is to be punished in accord with seriousness of act or omission).
5See Francis G. Morrisey, Procedures to be Applied in Cases of Alleged Sexual
Misconduct by a Priest, 26 STUDIA CANONICA 39, 56-63 (1992) (proposing that two
goals of concluding procedures for inquiry prescribed by cannon 1717, should be
determining whether there are reasonable or probable grounds for believing priest
was involved in sexual misconduct and whether Church should proceed with
disciplinary action against priest).
As a response to requests from Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops in
1990, a work group of the Canadian Bishops Ad Hoc Commission on Sexual Abuse
prepared a document which proposed various procedures detailing what should be
done when situations of sexual abuse arose. Id. at 40. Proposals of the work group
included appointing a committee to conduct any preliminary investigation, careful
adherence to canonical norms in order to protect the accused priests rights, and
taking steps to ensure confidentiality of records. Id. at 44, 47. It should be noted
that the proposals of the Commission did not constitute an official document. Id. at
41. Rather, they were prepared to assist the Church in addressing issues not
covered by canon law. Id.
55 1983 CODE c.1717, §1.
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needed for a penal process."
The investigation must be careful from the start to protect
the reputation of all persons involved.57 This concern applies at
every stage of any process, whether administrative or judicial.58
Furthermore, any diocesan official who may be needed as a judge
in a penal process should have nothing to do with the
investigation.59 Nor should the diocesan bishop himself conduct
the investigation. °
Some have suggested that psychiatric experts should be
included in the investigation process. 1 Resorting to the opinions
of such experts should not substitute for effective investigation.
sId. c.1719.
5 See 1983 CODE c.1717, §2 (stating care must be taken to avoid endangering
someone's "good name").
68 See Provost, supra note 3, at 627-28 (noting canon law requires that privacy of
victim, his or her family, and clergyman are to be protected by church). Canon law
allows for both administrative and penal procedures to address allegations of sexual
misconduct by the clergy. Id. at 628. Regardless of which channel is utilized in an
investigation of sexual misconduct, the proceedings must be carried out quickly
while providing safeguards for the victim, the accused, and the community. Id.; see
Beal, supra note 6, at 651-55 (noting both administrative and penal process should
be conducted with "sensitivity and discretion" to protect both victim and accused
cleric).
59 1983 CODE c.1717, §3.
60 See Morrisey, supra note 54, at 49 (noting that Canadian Bishop's Ad Hoc
Commission on Sexual Abuse proposed that due to potential for conflict diocesan
bishop or major superior who personally receives allegation of sexual abuse should
not be involved in inquiry); see also Beal, supra note 6, at 647-48 (noting that
although canon 1717 gives diocesan bishop authority to personally conduct
investigation, it may be better for anotl er to conduct inquiry). A diocesan bishop
may lack the requisite skills to conduct an investigation. Id. at 648. Furthermore, a
bishop's high profile in the community may also attract unwarranted publicity, and
a bishop conducting an investigation may have to testify against his cleric in a
criminal trial. Id.
6 See Rev. Jerome E. Paulson, The Clinical and Canonical Considerations in
Cases of Pedophilia: The Bishop's Role, 22 STUDIA CANONICA 77, 122 (1988)
(proposing that when cleric is accused investigator should meet with parents and
suggest that child be interviewed by mental health professional "familiar with
problems of children in [the child's] age group"). It has also been argued that a
committee comprised of experts in various fields should conduct the investigation
into a cleric's sexual misconduct. See Beal, supra note 6, at 651 (noting that
Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops proposed that team of interdisciplinary
experts organized under diocesan bishop should conduct investigation). The
Canadian Bishop's Ad Hoc Commission on Sexual Abuse suggested that the
committee should be comprised of the priest appointed by the bishop to conduct the
inquiry, a canonist, a criminal lawyer, a civil lawyer, and a person licensed and
experienced in the treatment of sexual abuse victims, pedophilia and similar
illnesses. Morrisey, supra note 54, at 48, 50.
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While a "work-up" by a professional counsellor or clinic may
divulge propensities for misconduct, it does not of itself
demonstrate whether the acts upon which dismissal would be
based in fact occurred.2
The investigator is free to use any legitimate means to
uncover the truth or falsity of the allegations and is to present
all findings to the bishop. 3 In this regard, it should be noted
that the investigator "has the same powers and obligations as an
auditor"' and should observe the procedural norms of canons
1558-1571 so far as applicable.65
In pursuing this task, the investigator must balance a
healthy skepticism with respect for others. Clerics are in a
position where they are subject to false accusations. Such an
eventuality and the damage to the cleric's good reputation should
not be dismissed 66 and must be given appropriate consideration.
On the other hand, it is also difficult to bring and maintain an
accusation against a cleric, especially where the alleged victim is
a child and the cleric makes a forceful denial of the accusation.
The investigator must make it easy for the child and his or her
parents to share the information needed to determine the truth
of the matter and to assess the seriousness of the misconduct.
The investigation should include a search of the archives
(including the secret archives) of the dioceses (and religious
institutes, if applicable) where the accused cleric has served in
order to determine if previous accusations were made against
the cleric.67 The credibility of the accuser and of the accusation
itself should also be assessed.
62 In fact, "[tihere [have been] numerous cases, not as well publicized as those
where sexual misconduct did indeed occur, where careful investigation has
determined that the accused cleric did not commit the offense alleged." Beal, supra
note 6, at 653.
See 1983 CODE c.1718, §1.
1983 CODE c.1717, §3.
's Canons 1558-1571 prescribe the procedures for the examination of witnesses in
trials conducted under canon law. For example, the sections delineate how and
where witnesses should be examined, who may be present when witnesses are
questioned, how many witnesses should be introduced, and when witnesses may be
excluded from the penal process. 1983 CODE c.1558-1571.
6 See 1983 CODE c.220 (stating that no one is permitted to unlawfully damage
.good reputation" of another); see also Beal, supra note 6, at 653 ("When an
accusation of sexual misconduct is made public, [a] cleric's career in ministry may be
destroyed whether he is guilty or not.").
'" Beal, supra note 6, at 657.
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B. Determination (c.1718)
If the investigation has collected sufficient evidence to make
a determination, the bishop must decide the following:
i) Does the cleric's conduct represent a basis for initiating a
penal process? In other words, has the cleric in fact committed a
canonically-imputable delict?
ii) If so, is it still possible to initiate a timely penal process?
iii) If so, is it expedient to initiate a penal process?
With respect to this last point, canon 1341 indicates that,
when considering a response to misconduct, a bishop must be
equally concerned with repairing the harm caused by the
scandal, restoring justice, and reforming the accused cleric.68
IV. OPTIONS OTHER THAN PENALTIES
There are less drastic non-penal and penal options which
may be more appropriate where there is good reason to believe
that the cleric is guilty but the evidence is insufficient, or where
the nature of the proven misconduct does not warrant
dismissal.69
A. Administrative Actions of a Non-penal Nature
Certain administrative non-penal actions are possible even
prior to the issuance of the initiatory decree of canon 1718.70 If,
in the particular case, such administrative approaches are not
feasible at the outset, they may still emerge as viable options
Only after the bishop determines that these three goals cannot be sufficiently
met may he provide for a judicial or administrative procedure or impose penalties
on the cleric. 1983 CODE c.1341.
6 See Beal, supra note 6, at 661-66 (noting canonical options that may be
available to bishop when cleric is accused include proposing administrative leave to
accused cleric, or imposing it once penal process has began, restricting rights
enjoyed by cleric as member of ministry, monitoring cleric's activity within parish,
or persuading cleric to undergo professional evaluation or treatment). When a cleric
has engaged in sexual misconduct and cannot be reassigned, the bishop may decide
to impede him from the exercise of orders, or convince him to retire or take a leave
of absence and refrain from exercising his ministry. Id. at 672-75.
70 Once an investigation is completed, the investigator must report the findings of
the inquiry to the bishop. THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY,
supra note 1, at 1024. Upon receiving the report, the bishop will issue a decree
stating whether, based on the evidence, the penal process of the Church can be
initiated. See 1983 CODE c.1718 (stating that when evidence is sufficient bishop
decides whether to begin penal process and may revoke this decree upon finding of
contrary evidence).
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during the prosecution of a judicial process or even after its
conclusion.
1. Dispensation from Presbyteral Celibacy (cc.290-293)
The cleric might voluntarily petition the Holy See for a
dispensation from the obligations attached to orders and a
return to the lay state. The granting of such a dispensation is a
favor rather than a penal action. It differs essentially from
penal dismissal from the clerical state, not only because it is
non-penal in nature, but because the papal dispensation frees
the cleric from the obligation of celibacy, unlike judicial
dismissal."
Once the cleric submits the petition to the ordinary, he is to
be removed from the exercise of sacred orders in accord with the
Apostolic norms for the instruction of such a petition." This
removal remains in effect until a final disposition of the petition
is made by the Holy See.
While the voluntary submission of a petition for a
dispensation does not prevent the initiation of a penal process for
dismissal from the clerical state, the latter should normally be
stayed until a decision on the cleric's petition is forthcoming from
the Holy See. Conversely, a negative response by the Holy See to
the cleric's petition does not prohibit initiation of the penal
judicial process, and the details of the petition and its rejection
should be introduced into the case for consideration by the
tribunal regarding the appropriateness of a penalty.
2. Declaration of an Impediment to Exercise of Orders (c. 1044)
Canon 1041, 10 states that a person who labors under some
form of insanity or other psychic infirmity may, upon
consultation with experts, be found to be unfit for properly
carrying out the ministry (inhabilis iudicatur ad ministerium
rite implendum).73 Such a person is, under canon 1044, §2, 20
impeded from exercising his orders until his ordinary, upon
" See 1983 CODE c.291 (stating that dispensation from the obligation of celibacy
can be granted by Roman Pontiff alone).
72 See Decrees and Decisions, 41 JURIST 219, 226 (1981) (declaring once bishop
receives petition and decides to act further, he must prohibit petitioner from
exercising orders).
73 1983 CODE c.1041, §1.
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consultation with an expert, concludes that the impediment has
ceased and permits him to return to active ministry in an
unrestricted or appropriately restricted form.74
The impediment cannot be declared until the person has
been judged to be unfit to carry out the ministry properly, and
such unfitness must result from the psychic infirmity.7" If a
cleric is determined to suffer from pedophilia or ephebophilia to
the extent that his own ministry becomes a true danger to
children, he may be judged inhabilis and declared to be unfit by
his bishop."
This declaration does not remove the cleric from the clerical
state. He still enjoys certain rights of the clerical state,
including the right to decent support, and he is bound by its
obligations, at least those which he is capable of fulfilling.
Furthermore, if rehabilitation is successful, and the diocesan
bishop, after consulting with experts, determines that the cleric's
ministry no longer presents a danger to others, the bishop may
then permit him to exercise orders again."
Declaring the existence of an impediment to the exercise of
orders based on psychic defect is an administrative disciplinary
(i.e., non-penal) act. In positing the act, however, due process
must be followed, and the bishop is expected to rely on two
qualified advisors to assist him in reaching his final decision."
74 1983 CODE c.1044, §2, 20; Griffin, supra note 1, at 303-04.
" See Beal, supra note 6, at 673 (noting diocesan bishop must solicit opinion of
experts regarding disorder and its impact on cleric's ability to minister before
declaring impediment). Compare 1983 CODE c.1040 (stating only impediments that
exist are those listed in canon) with 1983 CODE C.1044, §2 (listing person
illegitimately receiving orders while impeded from doing so and persons affiliated
with some physic defect as only person impeded from exercising orders).
" See Beal, supra note 6, at 672-73 (noting that pedophilia and other similar
sexual disorders qualify as "psychic defects" for which cleric can be impeded from
exercising orders by bishop).
77 See L.M. Lothstein, Can a Sexually Addicted Priest Return to the Ministry after
Treatment? Psychological Issues and Possible Forensic Solutions, 34 CATH. LAW. 89,
89-90 (1991) (noting many priests who have committed sexual abuse have
successfully returned to ministry). The author's article was based in part on a
clinical study conducted at a psychiatric hospital to which clergy from all over the
United States were referred for treatment. Id. at 90. The author noted that 60% of
priests treated at the treatment center, and similar centers, were successfully
returned to active ministry. Id. at 110. Only a limited number of cases in which
priests returned to the ministry proved to be unsuccessful. Id.
78 See Beal, supra note 6, at 673 (noting bishop may utilize aid of two assessors in
evaluating evidence against accused cleric and rendering decree).
DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE
The cleric has a right of recourse against the bishop's decree in
accordance with the usual norms for administrative acts.7" This
recourse, however, unlike the recourse against the
administrative imposition of a canonical penalty, does not
suspend the effects of the decree.
B. Penal Remedies and Penances (cc. 1339-1340)
Besides these administrative disciplinary actions, there are
certain penal remedies and penances that are not strictly
canonical penalties such as the fraternal correction of the cleric,' °
or a reprimand of the cleric (public or private).8 In addition,
other pastoral remedies exist such as admonishing or warning
the cleric about his behavior,82 imposing a penance to be
performed by the cleric-even a public penance if the delict was
not occult,' attaching a specific penalty to a legitimate order
(precept)--the violation of which can then be punished as
warned;" and removing or restricting diocesan pastoral
faculties-e.g., the faculty to hear confessions (c. 974, §1), the
faculty to preach (c. 764), and the delegation to officiate at
marriages (c. 1111). Any of these penal remedies and penances
can be imposed by a simple decree of the bishop.' This applies in
a special way to the office of pastor (cf cc.528-530).
V. PENALTIES OTHER THAN DISMISSAL (cC.1331-1338)
Besides administrative disciplinary actions, penal remedies,
and penances, there are medicinal and expiatory penalties"
79 1983 CODE cc.1732-1739.
'o Id. c.1341.81 See id. c.1339, §2 (stating bishop can correct cleric in way appropriate to
particular circumstances).
Id. c.1339, §1.
Id. c.1340.
" 1983 CODE c.1319. Note, however, that certain faculties are incorporated into
an ecclesiastical office and may not simply be removed or restricted by a simple
administrative decree.
Id. c.1342, §1.
The bishop has discretion to apply penalties. JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 175 (1991). The purpose of expiatory penalties is to
repair harm to the community and serve as a deterrence to others. Id. at 176. Such
penalties may include deprivation of offices or powers or a prohibition on their
exercise. Id. at 176-77. Medicinal penalties are aimed at healing or curing the
offender. Id. at 177. Excommunication, interdict, and suspension are the three
medicinal penalties. Id.
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which, though truly penal in nature, do not rise to the level of
permanent dismissal from the clerical state. These penalties
may be imposed by an episcopal administrative decree provided
that they are not imposed perpetually. 7 Additionally, the cleric's
fundamental due process rights established by the
administrative penal process in canon 1720 must be recognized.'
Accordingly, administrative imposition of a canonical penalty,
even a temporary one, is subject to recourse on the part of the
cleric suspending the effect of the decree until a final
determination is made on the recourse. 9
A. Censures (cc.1331-1335)
Before a censure is imposed by episcopal decree, there must
be a canonical warning regarding the potential penalty and an
opportunity for the priest to withdraw from contumacy and
repent.90 Usually the canonical warning is made directly to the
cleric in question, outlining precisely what behavior gave rise to
the censure. This warning, however, may also be incorporated
into diocesan law.9"
87 1983 CODE c.1342, §2.
" Canon 1720 outlines the process to be followed in imposing or declaring a
censure or temporary expiatory penalty by administrative decree:
(1) The bishop is to inform the cleric about the accusation and the evidence
collected to date. He must give the cleric an opportunity to explain his
actions and defend himself against the accusation. A basic component of
the right of defense is the cleric's right to be advised by a canon lawyer at
all stages of the process. If the cleric is unwilling to cooperate. The bishop
should formally summon him to appear before him. If the cleric fails to
comply, the bishop may then proceed.
(2) The bishop is to consider carefully all the evidence and arguments in
consultation with two qualified advisors.
(3) If the bishop has reached moral certitude that the delict is proved and
the canonical statute of limitations has not expired, he is to issue the
administrative decree imposing the censure or temporary expiatory
penalty. The decree should state his reasons in law, and in fact, for
imposing the penalty. All of the exempting, mitigating and aggravating
factors and the other norms found in canons 1321-1327 and 1342-1350 are
to be observed in drawing up and issuing the decree.
1983 CODE c.1720.
" Id. c.1353.
90 Id. c.1347, §1 (authorizing "at least" one warning and granting time for cleric to
withdraw and repent).
9 In addition to the self-executing (latae sententiae) censures contained in the
code, particular diocesan law can establish self-executing censures for "scandalous
offenses or those acts which can not be punished effectively by inflicting penalties."
280
DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE
Individualized penal precepts threatening censures can also
be helpful in addressing situations where clerics persist in
scandalous or other prohibited behavior.9" In such cases,
precepts may be issued which threaten the imposition of specific
penalties. Particular law can also establish censures for various
sexual delicts to further specify the provisions in the code.93
Once imposed, all censures, as medicinal penalties, perdure
until withdrawal from contumacy occurs. Withdrawal from
contumacy involves the acts of truly repenting the offense and
making "suitable reparation for damages and scandal or at least
seriously promis[ing] to do so.""
However, using a censure to bring about the cleric's
compliance is a limited remedy. For example, expressly ordering
a cleric to seek psychiatric help under threat of canonical
penalty, while theoretically possible, hardly ever works and may
even be counterproductive. Such an order may violate the
cleric's right to privacy;9" and, unless information from the
psychiatric intervention is freely released by the cleric with no
hint of coercion, its admissibility in a future judicial process of
dismissal may run afoul of the cleric's right not to be forced "to
confess" or "take an oath."
96
B. Temporary Expiatory Penalties (cc. 1336-1338)
Besides censures, there are also expiatory penalties which
the bishop may temporarily impose. The bishop may:
i) order the cleric to live in or move away from "a certain
place or territory;
ii) remove the cleric from his pastoral office;9
1983 CODE c.1318. This could be done, for example, through a written admonition
which is promulgated as particular law for the diocese (or province), where the
liability to incur a specific latae sententiae censure, such as suspension, is expressly
stated in such a way that all clerics are on notice about the precise behavior which
would trigger the penalty. See Beal, supra note 6, at 661.
92 1983 CODE c.49; See also Beal, supra note 6, at 664 (describing how penal
precepts are used to prevent unsupervised contact between minors and sexually
deviant clerics).
1983 CODE c.1315, §3 (authorizing additional penalties).
Id. c.1347, §2.
9' Id. c.220 ("No one is permitted to ... violate the right of another person to
protect his or her own privacy").
96 Id. c.1728, §2 (establishing cleric's right against forced confessions and oaths).
9' Id. c.1336, §1, 2-.
1983 CODE c.1336, §1, 1.
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iii) withdraw the cleric's rights, privileges and faculties,
including those granted to the cleric by reason of the law or his
pastoral office;99
iv) prohibit the cleric from exercising his ministry together,
or partially, or in a particular place (this may even involve a
prohibition from celebrating Mass privately); 0
v) transfer the cleric to another office.10'
If the bishop concludes that one of the above-mentioned
expiatory penalties should be imposed permanently, such a
penalty cannot be imposed by episcopal decree, but must be
imposed only by way of the judicial process.1 0 2
VI. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS TO DISMISS FROM THE CLERICAL
STATE
If none of the above remedies is feasible or effective, which
might very well be determined at the outset, the bishop may
initiate the judicial process to dismiss the cleric from the clerical
state. Without becoming too immersed in procedural and
evidentiary details, the following points concerning the judicial
penal process might be of interest to diocesan attorneys.03
A. General Norms (cc.1400-1665, 1721-1728)
Analogous to some state criminal procedures which rely
heavily on civil procedure, the judicial penal process is governed
by the canons for trials in general"M and ordinary contentious
trials. 05 These general norms are specialized by the 'norms
applied to cases involving the public good as well as those
governing the penal process. 06
99Id.
"o Id. c.1336, §1, 30. The bishop cannot deprive the cleric of the "power of orders,"
but may only prohibit the cleric from exercising his ministry. Id. c.1338, §2.
'o Id. c.1336, §1, 40.
2 1983 CODE c.1342, §2.
"" For the remainder of this article, we shall assume: (1) that we are dealing with
a serious violation of canon 1395, §2 by a cleric's sexual abuse of a minor; (2) that,
considering all the circumstances, is good reason to dismiss the accused from the
clerical state; (3) that the bishop has issued an initiatory decree mandated by canon
1718 to commence the judicial process.
104 1983 CODE cc. 1400-1500.
10' Id. cc. 1501-1670.
""' Id. c.1728, §1 (authorizing application of special norms, canons 1721-1728, in
penal cases that concern "public good").
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B. Initiatory Decree (c. 1718)
Prior to issuing the initiatory decree which sets the process
in motion, the bishop should consult with at least two or more
qualified canon lawyers concerning the presence of the necessary
requisites for bringing the accusation (including the timeliness
required by the statute of limitations), the prospects for a
successful prosecution (including a consideration of the accused's
imputability), and the expediency, under the circumstances, of
imposing a permanent expiatory penalty. 7
C. Personnel
1. Promoter of Justice (cc.1430-1436)
The promoter of justice is a key figure in the process,
functioning as the prosecutor of the penal case."° Like a plaintiff
in a contentious case, the promoter brings the action, educes
evidence, argues the case, and appeals the sentence when
necessary. If the office of promoter of justice is vacant or the
promoter is otherwise unavailable or inappropriate, the diocesan
bishop may appoint an ad hoc promoter of justice.9
While there is disagreement as to whether the promoter
must be a priest, it is probably more advisable for the promoter
(and the notary) to be priests unless a particularly
knowledgeable and prudent deacon or lay person is available to
serve as promoter.
The promoter's principal duty is to seek justice. His concern
is the public good. Like a state district attorney, the promoter
shall not prosecute if he decides that there is no basis for the
prosecution."0 The same disinterested approach should mark
the acts of the preliminary investigator.
There is a parallel with most American civil jurisdictions.
Police conduct a preliminary investigation to establish probable
cause and make an arrest. After the arrest, the investigation is
quickly brought to the prosecutor's office. Working with the
107 1983 CODE c.1718, §§1-3.
'o Id. c.1430 (authorizing appointments of Promoters for "contentious cases in
which the public good could be at stake and for penal cases").
109 Id. c.1436, §2.
'1 1983 CODE c.1724, §1 recognizes that the Promoter may renounce the instance
even after the trial has commenced if the ordinary consents.
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police or with its own investigators, the prosecutor builds the
case without violating the rights of the accused. This is the role
of the promoter.
In canonical practice, it is probably more judicious to have
another diocesan official conduct the preliminary investigation
and bring matters to the attention of the promoter of justice
when it is clear that a judicial process is warranted and
desirable. However, there is nothing to prevent the promoter
from conducting a deeper investigation in order to obtain
additional evidence needed to prove the allegations and justify
the requested penalty."'
2. Collegiate Tribunal (cc.1419-1464)
Canon law calls for a collegiate tribunal of three judges in
penal cases where dismissal from the clerical state is a
possibility.112 If the case is considered especially difficult, the
bishop may entrust it to a collegiate tribunal of five judges."3
The American option permitting the use of a single judge in
matrimonial cases, while technically applicable, should not be
used in these cases.
The praeses should be the judicial vicar or an adjutant
judicial vicar;". if these are not available, it must be a cleric.
The other judges must simply fulfill the requirements of the
law."5 In practice, however, it is probably more advisable for all
three judges to be priests.
A judge who is appointed as a member of the collegiate
tribunal must recuse himself if he holds any personal bias for or
against the accused."6 Awareness of public facts regarding the
case which are generally known by priests or others in the
diocese does not necessarily warrant recusal.
A bishop may appoint ad hoc judges to the tribunal from
" For a licentiate dissertation on the Promoter of Justice see Thomas T.
Brundage, The Promoter of Justice Under the 1983 Code (1992), on deposit in John
K Mullen of Denver Memorial Library, The Catholic University of America,
Washington, DC 20064 (photocopies obtainable).
1 1983 CODE c.1425, §1, 20.
11 Id. c.1425, §2.
14 Id. c.1426, §2 (authorizing judicial vicars to preside over collegiate tribunals).
.. Id. c.1421, §§2, 3 (allowing lay persons with canon law experience to be
appointed to the tribunal).
.. Id. c.1448, §1. The same holds true for the Promoter of Justice and any
assessor or auditor used in the case. Id. at §2.
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outside the diocese. This approach might avoid unnecessary
questions about bias and may also permit the bishop to obtain
the services of judges (or a promoter of justice) who have greater
expertise and experience regarding these rare cases. The NCCB
and the Canon Law Society of America can be consulted to obtain
the names of canonists qualified to serve in such a capacity.
3. Advocate (cc. 1481-1490, 1723)
When the accused is cited, the judge invites him to appoint
an advocate. 17 If the accused fails to act in a timely fashion, the
judge has the duty to name a competent advocate prior to the
joinder of issues and the named advocate will function in this
capacity as long as the accused has not yet personally appointed
an advocate.1 ' The advocate appointed by the accused, or the
advocate appointed ex officio by the judge, must fulfill the
requisites of canon 1483,1" but is not required to be a priest.'20
4. Notary (c. 1437)
A priest-notary must be present during each processual act
and must notarize the written acts.'21 The chancellor or vice-
chancellor, if he is a priest and is not acting in some other
capacity in the trial, may serve as the notary, or the bishop may
appoint another priest as notary ad hoc'22 provided that he has a
117 1983 CODE c.1481, §1.
"8 Id. c.1723, §§1-2 (authorizing judges to appoint cleric's advocates as required by
c.1481, §1).
9 The advocate must be: a) 18 years of age; b) of good reputation; c) a Catholic
(unless the bishop permits otherwise); and d) possessing a doctorate in canon law
unless the bishop is convinced that the advocate is expert in canon law. 1983 CODE
c.1483.
120 See generally John B. Hesch, The Right of the Accused Person to an Advocate in
a Penal Trial, 52 JURIsT 723 (1992) (interpreting present and former code sections
applying to accused priest's right to advocate); see also 1983 Code of Canon Law
Ann. §1483 annot. (Wilson E. Lafleur 1993) (stating code implies women are also
allowed to be advocates).
'12 1983 CODE c.483, §2 (priests must act as notaries when "the reputation of a
priest can be called into question.").
'22 See THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 394.
A priest can be appointed as a notary if no priest holds the office, even if the
appointment is for only one case. Id.
See also 1983 CODE c.482 (determining procedure for appointment of
chancellors); c.471 (stating obligation of secrecy assumed by anyone accepting office
of notary); c.484 (describing duties of notaries).
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good reputation and is above reproach.'
D. Introducing the Case
1. Submission of the Libellus (cc. 1501-1505)
Pursuant to the decree initiating the process, the bishop
delivers to the promoter of justice all the information obtained in
the preliminary investigation in order to assist him in drawing
up a libellus of accusation to be presented in writing to a
competent judge."" The promoter of justice should normally
present this accusatory instrument to a competent judge within
five days from his receipt of the acts of the prior investigation
unless further investigation is warranted.'25
2. Admission or Rejection of the Libellus (cc.1501-1506)
Upon receipt of the libellus by a judge, the tribunal should
be constituted and the libellus accepted or rejected by the
tribunal within one month or ten days after a demand has been
made. 126
E. Citation of the Accused: Commencement of the Action (cc. 1507-
1512)
The citation of the accused (or the de facto appearance of the
accused and the promoter before the tribunal [c. 1507, §3])
represents the commencement of the first instance action.'27 If
the accused refuses to accept the citation or prevents it from
being delivered, he is deemed to have been legitimately cited.'28
Since the action is commenced by the citation of the accused,
'2 See 1983 CODE c.483, §2.
uAId. c.1721, §1.
Id. Canon 1504 specifies the content of the libellus. The libellus must:
1' express before which judge the case is being introduced, what is being
petitioned and by whom the petition is being made;
20 indicate the basis for the petitioner's right and at least in general the
facts and proof which will be used to prove what has been alleged;
30 be signed by the petitioner ... adding the day, month and year, as well as
the address of the petitioner ... for the purpose of receiving the acts;
40 indicate the domicile or quasi-domicile of the respondent.
Id. c.1504.
1983 CODE c.1506.
' Id. c.1517 ("The prosecution of a suit begins with the citation ... ").
Id. c.1510.
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the statute of limitations during which the action may be
interposed continues to run until a valid citation occurs. 129 This
is an extremely important point when attempting to preclude a
defense that the action is time-barred. Neither the initiatory
decree of the bishop to set the judicial process in motion nor the
submission of a libellus by the promoter of justice nor even the
decree admitting the libellus suffices to stop the running of the
statute of limitations. If the statute of limitations has expired
prior to the citation of the accused, the action will be time-
barred.1
30
On the other hand, even if the accused cleric's whereabouts
are unknown, a penal process may be initiated. Normally, such
circumstances would qualify as the recalcitrance addressed by
canon 1510, the basis for deeming him cited and declaring him
absent.
131
F. Administrative Leave of Absence (c. 1722)
Once the diocesan bishop has completed the preliminary
investigation and has issued the initiatory decree to initiate the
judicial (or administrative) process, he may, after consulting the
promoter of justice and citing the accused, bar the cleric from
exercising public ministry during the course of the penal process,
impose or forbid the cleric's residence in a given place or
territory, or even prohibit the cleric's public participation in the
'2 1983 CODE c.1512. ("Once the citation has been legitimately communicated or
the parties have appeared before the judge to pursue the case ... prescription is
interrupted unless otherwise provided."). See also THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT
AND COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 973:
Prescription is interrupted when the trial officially opens, either because
the apprising of the respondent about the claim of the petitioner dissipates
the respondent's good faith ..., or simply because the law considers it fair
that prescription be interrupted during a trial, especially in order to avoid
the possibility of the full term of prescription reaching maturity during the
course of the trial.
Id.
130 Criminal action by church courts is extinguished by prescription of five years
for offenses against the sixth commandment. 1983 CODE c.1362, §1. See also id.
c.1362, §2 ("Prescription starts on the day the offense was committed or on the day
when it ceased if the offense is continuous or habitual."). See generally Griffin, supra
note 1, at 308 (comparing the statute of limitations in church law with American
civil law).
" 1983 CODE c.1510. "A respondent who refuses to accept the document of
citation, or who prevents its arrival is considered as having been legitimately cited."
Id.
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Eucharist. 3 ' Such a prohibition may be issued to preclude
scandal, to protect the freedom of witnesses, or to safeguard the
course of justice. 13  Moreover, unlike the usual recourse against
the administrative imposition of a canonical penalty, recourse
against the administrative leave of canon 1722 is not suspensive
of the effects of the decree.'
G. Joinder of Issues (cc.1513-1516)
The joinder of issues should make it clear that the tribunal
is being asked to answer two questions. The first question is
concerned with whether the accused is guilty under canon law of
the specific delict(s) with which he is charged. The second
question deals with the appropriate punishment. If guilty, the
issue is whether the accused should be dismissed from the
clerical state or, in the alternative, if some other type of penalty
should be imposed.
H. Prosecution of the Case (cc.1517-1597)
The canonical method of prosecuting the case is not an
adversary method; it is akin to the inquisitorial method found in
civil law countries. 135  The judge has a great deal of discretion
132 1983 CODE c.1722; Griffin, supra note 1, at 307 ("Before such actions are taken,
the ordinary must consult with the Promoter of Justice and summon the accused.").
All administrative prohibitions are temporary and they are automatically
extinguished at the close of the penal process. Id. at 307-08. See also Bertram
Griffin, Imposition of Administrative Leave Against an Accused, ROMAN REPLIES
AND CLSA ADVISORY OPINIONS 103-08 (Washington, D.C.: CLSA 1988); Beal, supra
note 10, at 293 (detailing canonical arguments advanced in support of policies
calling for prompt withdrawal of cleric from his assignment and barring him from
public ministry as soon as denunciation is received).
'3 1983 CODE c.1722.
'4 See Id. c.1736 (specifying situations in which decree does not take effect until
after recourse is settled). Any recourse against a penal decree has suspensive effect.
Id. c.1353. "The present Code has also expunged the previous Code's explicit refusal
to grant any legal remedy against the imposition of 'administrative leave' .... Now
an affected cleric can lodge a hierarchical recourse against the Ordinary's decree
imposing 'administrative leave.'" Beal, supra note 10, at 309. See also THE CODE OF
CANON LAW: A TEXT AND COMMENTARY, supra note 1, at 1033 (stating that "if a
given recourse does not have suspensive effect, the author of the decree may
voluntarily suspend it while considering the petition for its withdrawal or
modification.").
'"" See Rev. Michael Hughes, O.M.I, The Presumption of Imputability in Canon
1321, §3, 21 STUDIA CANONICA 19, 32-33 (1987) (comparing common law penal
process to canonical penal process). The adversarial and inquisitorial processes
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concerning the discovery and admission of evidence. 13 6  The
instruction of the case can normally be done by one of the judges
of the collegiate tribunal who then reports to the others, 7 and
the tribunal can carry out some of its activity outside its own
seat. 13
The accused is never required to give testimony or other
information in a penal case. He can flatly deny the allegations
without saying anything more. It is for the promoter of justice to
prove the allegations concerning the violation of the penal law,
the imputability of the violation and the appropriateness of the
penalty. If the accused decides to write or speak, he has the
right to do so last, either personally or through an advocate or
procurator.'39 Even so, the accused is not bound to confess his
offense and he cannot be required to take an oath. 40 Thus, if the
accused agrees to testify under oath, he cannot be asked under
oath to confess. On the other hand, if in his testimony he
voluntarily confesses to the promoter's allegations, either totally
or partially, such testimony is admissible.
4
,
If the accused has already been subject to civil proceedings,
either in a criminal trial or in a civil action for damages and or
an injunction, a certification of the civil court's judgment is
differ procedurally, but beneath these differences, the same values are commonly
found. Id. In the adversarial process the function of judging the facts is assigned to
the jury, while the law is determined by the judge. Id. On the other hand, in the
inquisitorial system, the judge is both the fact-finder as well as the determiner of
thebjudgment of the issues. Id.
1983 CODE c.1452.
Id. c.1428, §1.
'3 Id. c.1469. "[Flor a just cause and after hearing the parties, judges can travel
outside their own territory in order to acquire proofs." Id. at §2. See also CODE OF
CANON LAW ANNOTATED 916 (E. Caparros et al., eds.) (1993) (determining that
activity outside a judge's territory "would always be valid and even lawful, if there
were a reasonable cause for it").
'0 1983 CODE c.1725.
'4' Id. c.1728, §2.
14 The rule about confession applies only to judicial confessions. See CODE OF
CANON LAW ANNOTATED, supra note 138, at 1066. "The accused could spontaneously
swear an oath: what is forbidden is that the judge ask the accused to do so." Id.
Moreover, if the accused admits to someone outside of the judicial proceedings that
he has committed some or all of the acts with which he is charged, proof of such
statements is admissible in the trial by written instrument, deposition or witness
testimony. As admissible hearsay, the probative force of such evidence must be
carefully weighed by the judge. See 1983 CODE c.1537 (stating it is for judge to
weigh all circumstances and to evaluate worth of extra-judicial confession).
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admissible as proof of a criminal conviction or civil judgment.4"
Such certification, however, does not represent conclusive proof
of the facts found by the civil tribunal.' Nonetheless, the record
of the civil proceeding may be introduced by the promoter or the
accused to prove particular issues and may be given whatever
weight the tribunal finds appropriate.'"
Circumstantial evidence is truly indispensable in a penal
case whenever the proof relies principally on the judicial
confession of the accused or declarations made by him outside of
the judicial proceedings. Confessions and admissions of the
accused, even if voluntarily given, are not dispositive. They are
admissible but "complete probative force cannot be attributed to
them unless other elements are present which thoroughly
corroborate them."' This rule is somewhat similar to the
requirement in some state criminal procedures for corroboration
of the accused's confession by extrinsic proof of the corpus delicti.
Expert testimony can be helpful to the tribunal and is
admissible provided that the qualifications of the experts are
clearly established and their testimony is truly necessary for
interpreting the facts. Experts are particularly helpful in
accessing the imputability of the accused. '
If a prospective witness is less than fourteen years old, the
child cannot testify unless the judge issues a decree declaring
such a hearing expedient."7 The judge also has broad discretion
12 1983 CODE c.1540, §2.
' See Beal, supra note 6, at 659 (finding that filing charges in civil court does not
"eliminate the need for a preliminary investigation to prepare for a possible
canonical process in the future").
'" In this regard, it is very important for the tribunal to determine the various
standards of proof used by the civil court. In a civil action, the proof is usually only
the fair preponderance of the evidence, although at times the court may require
more proof, perhaps rising to the level of clear and convincing evidence. In a
criminal proceeding, all courts require that the elements of the crime be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, which probably comes closest to the canonical concept of
moral certitude. Even in criminal proceedings, however, certain facts which may not
be elements of the crime charged may be proved based on a lesser standard. See
Beal, supra note 6, at 659.
... 1983 CODE c.1536, §2.
'4 See CODE OF CANON LAW ANNOTATED, supra note 138, at 977 (defining expert
as "one whose knowledge, experience, or art, makes him an authoritative specialist
in a particular field").
147 1983 CODE c.1550, §1.
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about who will be present when the child offers testimony."'
All priests, whether the accused himself or simply witnesses,
are prohibited from testifying about anything made known to
them by reason of sacramental confession even if the penitent
himself requests that they testify about the matter. Nor is the
testimony of anyone who may have overheard statements made
on the occasion of confession admissible in any way to prove the
truth of such statements. 1
49
I. Publication of the Acts and Conclusion of the Case (cc. 1598-
1606)
Once the promoter and the accused have had a reasonable
opportunity to supplement the acts previously published, the
judge issues the usual decree concluding the case. 5° The decree
of conclusion should normally be issued no more than ten days
after the decree of the publication of the acts."5
J. Judgment and Sentence (cc. 1607-1618)
The judgment must arise from the acts of the case itself and
from the evidence submitted. 1 2  An individual judge is not
permitted to base his decision on any personal knowledge he
may have about the issues.'53 If, at any stage of the process, a
judge determines that his personal knowledge about a material
fact would bias his decision in any way, he has the duty to recuse
' See 1983 CODE c.1559.
1s 1983 CODE c.1550, §2 (determining that priests are incapable of being
witnesses, in respect of "everything which has become known to them by reason of
sacramental confession, even if the penitent requests their manifestation .... ").
Moreover, anything that may in any way have been heard by anyone on the occasion
of confession, cannot be accepted even as an indication of the truth. Id. "The
sacramental seal is inviolable" and "Itihis prohibition is so absolute that nothing
heard by anyone during a confession may be accepted, not even as an indication of
the truth." CODE OF CANON LAW ANNOTATED, supra note 138, at 965.
" 1983 CODE c.1599, §1 ("When everything pertinent to the production of proofs
has been completed, it is time for the conclusion of the case"); Id. §2 ("The
conclusion takes place whenever the parties declare that they have nothing more to
add, or the time set by the judge for proposing proofs has expired, or the judge
declares that the case is sufficiently instructed"). Id. §3 ("[Tlhe judge is to issue a
decree that the conclusion of the case has been completed, in whatever manner it
took place.").
... Id. c.1598, §§1-2.
152 1983 CODE c.1608, §2.
"' Id. c.1608, §2; see also c.1448, §1.
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himself and withdraw.5  The sentence must settle the
controversy by answering the questions stated in the joinder of
issues as originally decreed or later amended.'55
K Renunciation (c. 1724)
The promoter has the right to renounce the action at the
order of, or with the consent of, the bishop who decreed that the
action should be brought.'58 If the accused has not been declared
absent from the trial, the consent of the accused is also required
for the tribunal to accept the promoter's renunciation of the
instance.'57 Therefore, if the promoter concludes during the
prosecution that the allegations are false or cannot be proven
and seeks to extinguish the action, the accused has the right to
insist that the action proceed and a sentence be published
declaring him not guilty.'58
L. Appeal (cc. 1619-1640)
If the accused has been found guilty and the penalty of
dismissal has been imposed, the lodging of an appeal by the
accused within the prescribed time limit suspends the effect of
the penalty until the appeal is decided.5 9 Because an appeal to
the second instance tribunal is not mandatory, it is the choice of
the accused and the promoter of justice."W If invoked, the right
must be exercised within fifteen available days (tempus utile)
from notification of the publication of the sentence.' All
incidental cases should be decided together with the principal
case so that separate appeals against interlocutory sentences
and resolutions of incidental questions do not delay the
'54 Id. c.1448, §2 (stating that promoter of justice, defender of the bond, assessor,
and auditor must disqualify themselves under same circumstances); Id. c.1449, §1
(allowing that if judge does not withdraw, affected party may lodge objection against
him); Id. c.1461 (stating that same rules hold true at any stage of case where judge
becomes aware of his incompetence).
155 1983 CODE c.1611, 10.
... Id. c.1724, §1.
... Id. c.1724, §2.
... Id. c.1524, §3 (specifies that a valid renunciation must be made in writing and
must be communicated to the other party who must accept it, or at least not attack
it, and must be admitted by the judge).
159 Id. c.1353.
... Id. c.1628.
'a' Id. c.1630, §1.
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process.'62 Thus, all are handled together in the one appeal. 6 3
If a finding of guilt and the imposition of dismissal from the
clerical state is upheld by the appellate tribunal, or there has
been no legitimate appeal by the guilty party within the
prescribed time limit, the tribunal of first instance orders that
the sentence be executed'" and that the guilty party be given
notice.'65 The bishop of the diocese in which the first instance
sentence was rendered then executes the sentence personally or
through a delegate.' At that moment, the guilty party is
definitively dismissed from the clerical state.'
6 1
M. Secrecy and Disposition of the Acts (cc.489, 1455)
The proceedings are conducted in a confidential manner in
order to protect the reputations of all concerned, particularly
that of the accused.6 8  Unlike a civil trial, presence at the
examination of witnesses is limited to the judge (the entire
collegiate tribunal need not be present) and the notary.169 Since
there is no requirement that the accused or the promoter be
present, they can participate only if admitted by the judge. The
advocates may participate unless the judge "believes that the
process must be carried on in secret because of the
circumstances of things or persons."' ° In such a case, the
.6 See id. c.1589, §1.
The judge, having received the petition and heard the parties, is to decide
very promptly whether the proposed incidental question seems to have a
basis and a connection with the principal issue ... and, if it is admitted,
whether it is of such seriousness that it must be resolved by an
interlocutory sentence or by a decree.
Id.
163 See id. c.1589, §2.
On the other hand, if the judge decides that the incidental question is not
to be resolved before the definitive sentence, the judge is to decree that it
will be considered when the principal case is settled.
Id.; see also id. c.1637, §4 (stating that, without evidence to the contrary, it is
presumed that an appeal is made against the entire sentence).
'" Id. c.1651 (stating that "[t]here can be no execution of a sentence prior to an
executory decree of the judge in which it is stated that the sentence must be
executed").
' 1983 CODE c.1363, §1.166 Id. c.1653, §1.
11, Id. c.1654, §1.
6' Id. c.1455, §3.
IN 1983 CODE c.1561.
170 Id.
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advocates may submit questions to the judge in advance of the
examination. 7' Similarly, even where others are present at the
examination of a witness, the questioning is done by the judge
unless he permits those present to pose questions directly to the
witness. 1
72
The judges, the promoter, and the notary are bound ex officio
to secrecy.'73 Since reputations are always involved in such
trials, the tribunal should bind all the witnesses, the experts, the
accused, and the advocates and procurators by oath to observe
174
secrecy.
Upon completion of the case, the acts are to be filed in the
secret archives. 175 If all appeals have been completed and the
sentence executed, the acts are retained for ten years after the
date of the condemnatory sentence.'76 If the dismissed cleric
should die during that period, the acts are destroyed within one
year after the date of death.177 In either case, a brief summary of
the case and the text of the definitive sentence are retained in
the secret archives.
178
VII. IMPUTABILITY (cc. 1321-1330)
As mentioned above, one of the principal objections to the
judicial imposition of dismissal in cases of sexual abuse of a
minor is the requirement of full imputability. 19  There is no
171 Id. c.1561.
172 id.
173 1983 CODE c.1455, §1.
174 Id. c.1455, §3.175 Id. c.489, §1.
171 Id. c.489, §2.
177 Id.
178 1983 CODE c.489, §2.
179 Imputability denotes what is necessary to establish one's guilt. In this instance
full imputability means the existence of both the actus reus, the external act, and
the mens rea, the mental intention. The imputability necessary for guilt under
canon law is set forth in canon 1321. See Hughes, supra note 135, at 19-36;
Elizabeth McDonough, A Novus Habitus Mentis for Sanctions in the Church, 48
JURIST 727-46 (1988).
The imputability necessary for guilt under canon law mirrors that of ordinary
criminal law, and neither canon law nor criminal law will punish thoughts alone.
1983 CODE c.1321, §§1-2. Both, however, provide for the presumption of guilt of
mind based on the actions of certain crimes. Under canon law, imputability is
presumed whenever an external violation has occurred, unless facts and
circumstances prove otherwise. 1983 CODE c.1321, §3.
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brightline rule. Each case is different and must be judged
according to the law and the facts and circumstances
demonstrated to the tribunal. The tribunal's judgment in
determining the imputability needed for imposition of dismissal
must be based solely on the acts of the case and on the rules of
law.180
A. Actus Reus
Violations of canon 1395, as with all delicts, are committed
solely by external acts. No one commits a delict by, nor can
anyone be punished canonically for, an interior act, a tendency to
criminal behavior, or a sin of thought or desire, no matter how
serious.' Thus, while the cleric's past acts and his propensity
are admissible as some evidence (particularly as to imputability
and the appropriate punishment), they are no basis for the
imposition of the penalty of dismissal from the clerical state
without proof of the actus reus.
B. Mens Rea
Conversely, the external act alone does not suffice. 82 It
must be a human act, posited with sufficient internal
deliberation and freedom to be gravely imputable insofar as it
results from personal malice or culpability." Thus, unless a
specific law determines otherwise, one may not be punished
canonically for an act of negligence since negligence is, by
definition, non-deliberate.'" Furthermore, when the accused has
committed a delict with sufficiently grave imputability but is
shown to have lacked full imputability, the diminution in
imputability represents a basis for mitigation of the penalty.'85
C. Presumption of Imputability and Burden of Proof
Some argue that there is an inherent contradiction in
1983 CODE c.1321, §2 (stating that one who has violated law or precept is
bound by penalty stated therein).
11 Id. c.1321, §1.
12 Id.; but see id. §3 (stating that "[u]nless it is otherwise evident, imputability is
presumed whenever an external violation has occurred.").
18 Id. c.1321, §1.
1 1983 CODE c.1321, §2.
"5 Id. c.1324, §1, 100.
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dismissing a pedophile from the clerical state since the proof of
the accused's psychological illness, manifested by his external
violations, is itself proof of his lack of full imputability.'86 This
facile and simplistic statement is incorrect, since it would render
the proscription of canon 1395, §2 meaningless in se, relegating
its application to some sort of imaginary cleric who, though free
of all psychological illness and disordered desire, chose, with
impeccable deliberation and freedom, to abuse a young person
sexually.
The presumption provided from canon 1321, §3 resolves the
doubt in the external forum. Once an external violation has been
proven, imputability is presumed unless otherwise evident (nisi
aliud appareat).'87 Without evidence of facts which clearly show
that the imputability of the accused was diminished, the tribunal
must find in favor of full imputability.l"
While canon law has not developed jurisprudence along the
lines of the state criminal procedure debate concerning the
M'Naghten Rule189 and the irresistible impulse theory, 9° it does
recognize similar rules of law in the area of psychological illness.
An illness is not to be automatically equated with lack of
personal responsibility for the external violations themselves.
Despite the illness, the accused may have been fully aware of the
nature and consequences of his actions and have possessed
sufficient freedom, in a theological sense, to be charged with not
merely grave, but full, imputability as understood in the penal
186 See Cafardi, supra note 9, at 171-172. See also Beal, supra note 6, at 679-680.
117 1983 CODE c.1321, §3.
" For a discussion on the presumption of imputability, see Hughes, supra note
135. Hughes may go too far, however, when he concludes that the presumption
yields not simply before contrary proof or before a probability but even before a
"possibility that it may be false" [emphasis in the original]. Id. at 34.
' The M'Naghten Rule is a test for insanity which limits criminal responsibility
when, due to a mental disease or defect, a defendant either did not know what he or
she was doing or did not know what he or she was doing was wrong. The M'Naghten
case, decided in 1843, is the basis for most insanity defenses used today. RONALD M.
PERKINS, RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAw 958-968 (3d ed. 1982); see also ROBERT
F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 27-60 (1991).
'90 Some jurisdictions which still use the M'Naghten Rule also use the "irresistible
impulse" test. A person is not guilty by reason of insanity if he or she could not
control his or her conduct due to a mental disease, even if the defendant knew what
he or she was doing was wrong. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW 320 (2d ed 1986); see also PERKINS, supra note 189, 968-75.
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D. Exempting, Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances
The tribunal must weigh all exempting, mitigating and
aggravating circumstances which may have an effect on
imputability and on the severity of the appropriate penalty.'
Two mitigating factors which may arise are the lack of
rational behavior caused by drunkenness or some other narcotic
agent or as the commission of an act in the heat of passion."2 Of
course, if one is aware that drunkenness or narcotic use often
leads to such acts and decides to drink or ingest such narcotics
anyway, the resulting loss of the use of reason does not diminish
full imputability.'93 Similarly, when passion is freely stimulated
or fostered by the accused, it cannot be taken into account as a
mitigation of imputability.1
94
Aggravating circumstances may also come to bear in
deciding the imputability and severity of the penalty. The cleric
may have used his position in the Church or his authority or his
office to commit the offense.' If a cleric uses his familiarity
with parishioners or other youths to create situations in which
such acts are committed, or, as an authority figure, exercises
undue influence over the victim, the acts become even more
heinous and deserving of more severe punishment, offsetting the
mitigation which might otherwise be applicable.
Another common aggravating circumstance may be
recidivism. When the accused, because of his own history and
self-awareness, foresees what is going to happen and takes none
of the precautions to avoid such acts which a reasonably prudent
person would take, the resulting acts may warrant a more severe
penalty. In other words, prior acts which foreseeably contribute
to the occurrence of intentional acts may counteract the
mitigation which might result from a lessening of freedom in
regard to later acts committed by reason of some inner
compulsion. One who is aware of a tendency toward a certain
delict has the responsibility to take due precautions, carefully
1'91 1983 CODE cc. 1324-1326.
'92 Id. c.1324, §1, 2°-3 °.
'9' Id. c.1325.
19 Id.
'9' Id. c.1326, §1, 20.
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monitoring the persons he associates with, his use of alcoholic
beverages, his need for psychiatric therapy, the nature of the
ministerial assignment he accepts. To omit such precautions can
be grounds for infliction of a more severe penalty.
Finally, a cleric may be charged with multiple violations of
canon 1395, §2 or other provisions of the Code. Where an
ingrained pattern of behavior or several interconnected
violations have occurred, the justification for dismissal from the
clerical state may be extremely strong even though some
psychopathology may have diminished the malice or culpability
involved in some of the individual acts.
The accused's imputability is an essential element of any
decision to dismiss a cleric from the clerical state. It cannot be
looked upon simplistically, nor can legal rules alone settle the
matter in some sort of mechanical fashion. The actual facts and
circumstances of the accused cleric himself, his history, the
context within which the proven acts took place, and especially
the gravity of the acts must all be taken into account.
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VIII. NOTE: DISMISSAL FROM THE CLERICAL STATE OR DISMISSAL
FROM THE DIOCESE?
This article has addressed various approaches to the
canonical dismissal of a cleric from the clerical state. The
penalty would release the diocese canonically from its obligation
to support the wrongdoer. If not dismissed, the cleric would
remain incardinated in the diocese. There is no diocesan
canonical device comparable to the dismissal of a religious priest
from the religious institute.'97 For a diocesan priest, membership
in the clerical state and incardination in the diocese are
coextensive.
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that where a legitimate
declaration of mental incapacity has taken place and the priest
will not, in the foreseeable future, carry out any priestly ministry
on behalf of the diocese, the ongoing support of the priest could
be framed in terms of a "severance package." In this way, the
priest would remain a member of the clerical state and would
'9 For a clinical description of the variations and degrees of severity of such
sexual disorders, see Peter Cimbolic, The Identification and Treatment of Sexual
Disorders and the Priesthood, 52 JURIST 598 (1992).
'a' See discussion, supra note 1.
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still be canonically incardinated in the diocese, but the usual
indicia of supervision (remuneration for services, provision of
housing, reimbursement of ongoing expenses, other fringe
benefits connected with active priestly ministry) would be
removed. While the canonical duty of decent support would be
observed, it would be provided in a way that would make clear to
the reasonable observer that the priest in question, at least from
a practical point of view, is living an independent life and cannot
be viewed as either representing the diocese in any way or as one
whose priestly activities are being actively supervised by the
diocese.9
IX. CONCLUSION
When a cleric has sexually abused a minor, he may very well
undertake a course of therapy and be successfully reintegrated
into ministry, or, alternatively, he may recognize that he should
no longer continue as a cleric. In the latter case, the cleric will
voluntarily petition for a dispensation from the Apostolic See
returning him to the lay state.
In other cases, a cleric may be falsely accused or allegations
may be exaggerated. The Church calls for a thorough
investigation of such accusations to make certain of the facts
before any penal process is invoked.
Sometimes, however, after due investigation, it may be
apparent that a cleric has sexually abused a minor, or perhaps
several minors, and represents a danger to children and a harm
to the entire Church community. His diocesan bishop may
conclude that the cleric should not remain a member of the
clerical state. Yet, such a cleric may not be willing to petition for
a dispensation from presbyteral celibacy and the other
obligations of orders.
In this type of situation, it may be advisable to utilize the
Church's penal process for the dismissal of the accused from the
clerical state. The process is designed to protect the rights of the
accused as well as the rights of victims and the Church itself. It
is not likely that such a process will be frequently invoked. It
should not be commenced unless the diocesan bishop is
reasonably certain that the cleric is guilty of the charges and
See Griffin, supra note 1, at 302.
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that dismissal from the clerical state is the only appropriate
remedy.
Once the bishop is convinced of this pastoral situation,
however, the prosecution should go forward competently,
respectfully, speedily and resolutely, to make certain that the
cleric is dismissed form the clerical state and will no longer be in
a position to abuse the trust which the Church, through
ordination, has placed in him. The process should be followed
cautiously in order to serve the threefold purpose of the Church's
penal law: to bring about the reform of the accused, to repair the
harm that has been done to individual members of the Church
and to the Church as a community, and to restore the torn
mantle of justice for all concerned.
In the latter case, the Church has set forth a process for the
dismissal of the accused from the clerical state provided that the
responsibility for the canonical violation is properly proven and
the penalty appropriately imposed. This process should be used.
It is designed to protect the rights of the accused as well as the
rights of victims and the Church itself. The diocesan bishop, the
Promoter of Justice and the assigned collegiate tribunal should
not shirk from their duty to apply the penal law of the Church to
such pastoral situations.
